The Right to Bear Arms
Posted by Jim Newman on February 25th, 2013 – 2 Comments – Posted in politics, Uncategorized
In a previous post I quoted Chris Rodda’s article on David Barton’s book on the second amendment. Aside from his bullshit, the question is does the Militia statement relate to the rest of the Second Amendment. Also, whether bearing arms means a citizen can have arms for nonmilitia purposes. Frankly, as an aside, I would follow the Swiss and make every person enlist in some way, com or noncom, and train every young man, or person, in armed defense, and they would keep their military accouterments at home in case of war–please, don’t send me hate mail. I also think generals should lead as in the Israeli army and not hide behind their desks. Oops, I did it again; this article is about the right to bear arms and not the responsibility to bear arms.
It is true the Supreme Court disambiguated the term but Scalia, who wrote the majority opinion, has often been quite open that he has a political agenda. Last July he put more fine a point on it. I only say this because I do consider him and his ilk to be willing to change the constitution as they please in spite of his insistence, they (whoever they are) are returning to original intent. First the argument for detachment.
“Oedel goes on to argue that since the Second Amendment begins with the phrase “A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free state,” that there’s reason to believe the right to keep and bear arms was meant to be exercised in connection with a government-sponsored militia. To the contrary, in the Heller decision, the majority found the clause to be merely “prefatory.” For those of us who do not teach constitutional law, prefatory means of, relating to, or constituting a preface (or more simply put, located in front). Further, the court found the clause does nothing to limit the scope of the “operative clause” of the amendment, namely, the right to keep and bear arms.
“Ironically, the court used this “detachment” to affirm the right of the government to ban from private hands certain sophisticated weaponry that might be useful in military service but that are unusual in society at large. Oedel is wrong to conclude, however, that this grants the government broad power to ban guns in common use because someone has given them a menacing name.
In dissent, joined by Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, Justice Stevens said:
The Amendment’s text does justify a different limitation: the “right to keep and bear arms” protects only a right to possess and use firearms in connection with service in a state-organized militia. Had the Framers wished to expand the meaning of the phrase “bear arms” to encompass civilian possession and use, they could have done so by the addition of phrases such as “for the defense of themselves”.
Paul Finkelman the noted legal scholar writes extensively on how it is about the Militia. He throughly deconstructs Scalia’s argument by showing how these words are part of the amendment and how other federal laws support the inclusion of it.
He (Scalia) rests much of his case on an analytical argument of the language of the Amendment that is at best confused, and on an historical argument that is limited and wrong headed.
A Milita was never meant as vigilante war protectionism. Militia was always meant as under federal authority giving the feds vast lee way in what is allowed in terms of a weapon, arms.
“Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution is extraordinarily specific in endowing Congress with the power “To provide for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the union, suppress insurrections and repel invasions; To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the militia, and for governing such part of them as may be employed in the service of the United States, reserving to the states respectively, the appointment of the officers, and the authority of training the militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress.”
“The term “militia” is also to be found in Article II, Section 2 in which the “President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called into the actual Service of the United States.”
“In other words, the United States Constitution handed to Congress the power to call upon those to whom they had given the right to keep and bear arms to form a disciplinary force that ultimately answered to the President in his role as Commander-in-Chief of the military. The power to appoint officers and train militia members remained under the domain of their respective states, but in regard to who possessed final word over calling for militias to perform the duties of protecting the freedom of Americans from internal revolution and external invasion, the issues of states’ rights has absolutely no bearing.
The beginning of the post on Odel,”common at the time” contradicts what Scalia said. Originally, he said rocket launchers, yes, later no, penultimately, maybe, and finally, carefully. Scalia is reaching way out there, confused. Bare arms, bear arms, aaah, whatever.
“My starting point and probably my ending point will be what limitations are within the understood limitations that the society had at the time,” he said. “They had some limitations on the nature of arms that could be borne. So we’ll see what those limitations are as applied to modern weapons.”
…
“The 180 degree turn in how the Second Amendment is to be interpreted and how that interpretation will affect all future gun control legislation rests primarily upon Scalia’s contention that while the writers did take the unprecedented step of providing a specific purpose for the right to keep and bear arms, the necessity for a well-regulated militia should be viewed as just one example of that purpose. It is worth keeping in mind that Antonin Scalia is the very same Supreme Court justice who suggested that any weapon that can be carried in one’s hand may be subject to Second Amendment protection, even if that weapon is capable of launching a rocket that could knock an airplane out of the sky.
Without taking too much more space here, it is clear the US needed to protect themselves from citizens forming vigilante militia groups that could become traitorous, as well as enlist citizens to militia. With the advent of far superior weaponry, it would be difficult for any group of citizens to form a legally effective revolution but they still could now do tremendous damage. Unfortunately video media makes killing people look easy and belies the difficulties of modern war fare.
This terrifies many common conservatives, rednecks or old school, who would wish for the continued ability to revolt against a government they believe has become corrupt, or is after them.
Homemade explosives, incendiary devices, many can be hand carried and much protection is covered by regulating the materials that comprise them. Nevertheless a suicide bomber could have a devastating effect simply be doing it near officials. We tend to say we hate suicide, eschew suicide bombing as tactic, but we admire the soldier that dives on the grenade to save his pals.
As such, the best means of protecting the government and citizens is to maintain an armed militia separate from citizens with careful regulation to prevent military takeover. The disparity of weapon effect from a technological view will always problematize the choice of allowed weapons but an ideology would be better control. That is essentially served by the ultimate federal control of militia. It’s not about hunting and it’s not about personal protection. It’s about who has the power to say whom and with what.
In an arms, weapons, sense idiotic talk about taking guns to DC, harming a president, and vigilante law and order (shoot first, talk later; guns in schools; guns at market; guns everywhere) are more dangerous than the weapons discussed, and pander to little boy fantasies of grown ups. Emotional maturity is most important as it will slide under the so called mental health screen. Concurring police who say if Joe had had a pistol Suzy wouldn’t have been shot are simply wrong–only isolation or a group of well-trained security people can prevent an assassination. If you want security go into Internet safety.
Bruce Schneier covers this issue in his book, “Liars and Outliers; Enabling the Trust that Society Needs to Thrive.” It is simplistic to think the people’s (whoever they are) right to bear arms will resolve security issues.
Liars and Outliers reaches across academic disciplines to develop an understanding of trust, cooperation, and social stability. From the subtle social cues we use to recognize trustworthy people to the laws that punish the noncompliant, from the way our brains reward our honesty to the bank vaults that keep out the dishonest, keeping people cooperative is a delicate balance of rewards and punishments. It’s a series of evolutionary tricks, social pressures, legal mechanisms, and physical barriers.
In the absence of personal relationships, we have no choice but to substitute security for trust, compliance for trustworthiness. This progression has enabled society to scale to unprecedented complexity, but has also permitted massive global failures.
At the same time, too much cooperation is bad. Without some level of rule-breaking, innovation and social progress become impossible. Society stagnates.
Jim Newman, bright and well








Scalia does appear to have a personal agenda, granted, but the existence of such an agenda does not necessarily mean his interpretation of specific Constitutional law is immediately suspect. That position is ad hominem. What needs to be examined is the specific argument made in that interpretation. In this instance it involves the initial clause of the Second Article of Amendment of the United States Constitution. First of all, constitutional amendments override or modify the meaning of earlier parts of the Constitution. Using such parts to interpret those amendments is improper as a consequence as their wording is no longer in effect. Next, a clause in a law that has legal effect or meaning does one of two things, regulate (compel or restrict conduct) or define. Historically clauses in a law have also been used for political or philosophical assertions as well (much of the Preamble of the United States Constitution is of this nature). So, a the test can be readily defined to check the nature of a clause to see if it has any legal effect. An example of definitive language might be “The length of a pistol barrel is 4 inches”. Examples of regulatory language would be “People must wash their vehicles every first Sunday of the month” (compelling), or “A person may not go past a sign saying ‘keep out’” (restrictive). A philosophical clause might be “We find these truths to be self-evident”. A political clause would be something like “In honor of the memory of George Washington”. So what of the militia clause of the 2nd? “A well-regulated militia being necessary for a free state,…” is its wording. We see no language where an object is being defined, and we so no language of a compelling or restrictive nature. All we have is an assertion of belief (historic note: that belief didn’t hold up during actual wartime!). If this was intended to restrict rights to only a militia by what linguistic device was this connection made? We do have in the next clause “shall not be infringed” which is definitely regulatory, and the usage of the legal term “the right of the people” as the subject of that clause where “the people” is the group that defines the boundaries of that regulation. BUT the phrase “keep and bear arms” is a well established military term and inherently limits that right to a military usage. And even though it might have been modified, the unmodified portions of the original Constitution does limit the purpose of any militia activity to public service against invasion and rebellion.
There is other Federal statute that defines a militia member in the U.S. as a private citizen without regard to any formal membership in a public military organization. (I can provide a cite later but I have to look it up again). The Constitution does grant the Federal government to be able to “call up” the militia, but did not give it the authority to regulate the whole of it. In the above cited clause in Art. I, Sec. 8, it limits that governance to only the instance only those people in the Federal government’s employee.
Sorry about the incompleteness of the argument and limited cites. I’m in the middle of things at home right now and don’t have the time to give my response the attention it deserves.
Thanks for taking what limited time you have. What is clear to me is that law has no obvious trajectory in spite of the care often given to words and setting precedents, or what is appropriate to the specific kind of law. Two constitutional lawyers can provide evidence on either side of an issue. Indeed, as a profession, a lawyer might be hired to produce support on either position, though, a wise client would choose to seek a lawyer that seems to have a general position or history of cases similar to what is sought. Sometimes lawyers are sought simply because they have the charisma or acumen to win which seems to have little to do with law and much to do with personality.
In this sense, knowing the position of a lawyer is helpful in determining the ongoing tenor of the arguments to be involved. Orrin Hatch has voted 100% Republican. If he were to make an opinion or even win a case based on a set of arguments or precedences, I would expect it to be a Republican view. If it weren’t, I would look very closely at why not. As an outsider, arm chairing, I would probably put more emphasis on context and history rather than only the linearity of the argument. Nevertheless, during courtroom discourse, discussing this context is pointless. Yet, we do offer character witness and backgrounding even to lawyers?
A lawyer may choose a career based on their desire to support and promote a specific kind of law and a specific position on that law. In other words, if a lawyer with strong history of punitive justice were to suddenly support restorative justice, speaking philosophically here, I would suspect their position and look at their evidence even more closely, assuming I might have missed a punitive angle to their argument; is the argument to bring forth something I missed that may even have less to do with what is at hand but for future utility?
If I were a lawyer, I would want to know the other lawyer’s biases, actions, and politics to have a better idea what approaches and arguments, both what to expect and what to put forward, as well as the judge’s and so forth. While these all seem like ad hominem tactics I would consider it good research in the setting of the situation.
Since I am not a lawyer, you would know far more about this than I do but I have heard lawyers remark about tactics that have less to do with the law and more to do with the inclination and style of the people involved.
Here, I am playing with ideas and looking at the debate from my own myopic view and not looking to a specific case. The law is so incredibly difficult and complex that without years of training I would have little hope of providing any kind of case by case salience.
Laws do change, sometimes dramatically. My wife knew years ago Roe vs Wade couldn’t really stand the test of time and yet still supported it to build public support to encourage lawyers to gain the energy and time to make better arguments, or for the public to catch and insist on new law, new review of precedence, or new clarification of terminology.
I don’t think this blog, a quick and facile view of what is at hand, really deserves much attention. I’m flattered you even bother to respond. Good luck.